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CHICAGO MATH AND SCIENCE ACADEMY: ARE CHARTER 
SCHOOLS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE UNDER THE NLRA, AND 
DOES IT MATTER? 
By Stanley B. Eisenhammer and Christopher M. Hoffmann 
Stanley Eisenhammer is a partner with Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick &  Kohn, LLP and has 
been practicing law in Illinois since 1973. Much of his practice focuses on public labor relations, and he 
regularly practices before the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board. He is a former board member 
and president of the Board of Education of Northwest Township High School District 214, and he has 
served as a trustee on the Board of Trustees of the Village of Arlington Heights. Mr. Eisenhammer is 
also a member of the Advisory Committee to the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board. 
Chris Hoffmann is an associate at Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn, LLP. He earned his 
J.D. from IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law in 2011, where he was a member of the IIT Chicago-Kent Law 
Review and the Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal. Mr. Hoffmann currently practices in 
all areas of school and municipal law. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Charter schools are at the forefront of educational reform. Freed of burdensome 
state regulation and onerous administrative requirements, charter schools are 
intended to offer parents and their children innovative methods of teaching and 
learning that have yet to be replicated in traditional public schools. As a result, 
charter schools have rapidly expanded across the country, experiencing enormous 
growth and ever increasing enrollment,[1] since the nation’s first charter school 
law was passed in 1991 in Minnesota.[2] Charter schools will also  have an 
increasing impact on labor relations in the public sector as more teachers, who 
would be employed in often heavily unionized traditional public schools, now find 
themselves employed at charter schools that either are exempt from state collective 
bargaining laws or do not have a history of unionization. 
Will charter schools’ unique status as laboratories for educational change and 
innovation have the effect of eroding employee participation in unions?[3] If so, 
will state legislatures respond by changing their labor relations laws and/or charter 
school laws so that charter schools are treated the same as traditional public 
schools under their labor relations laws?[4] Or will the recent backlash against 
public employees and their unions[5] cause state legislatures to avoid the issue? 
The answers to these questions depend upon whether state legislatures view the 
right to collectively bargain as an impediment to educational innovation and 
change or a fundamental protection for public employees that can coexist with the 
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educational reform movement. However, the power to decide this important policy 
question can be taken out of the hands of state legislators if labor relations at 
charter schools are found to be governed by the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”). 
The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) recently found that Illinois charter 
schools fall with the jurisdiction of the NLRA. Although the opinion is specifically 
limited to Illinois charter schools and the NLRB declined to establish any “bright-
line test,” it appears likely that most, if not all, charter schools, by their very nature, 
will fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRA regardless of whether they are made 
subject to a state’s collective bargaining laws. 
Because this case arose in a state where charter schools were not exempted from 
Illinois’ collective bargaining laws, the parties to the case, including 
the amici National Education Association, the American Federation of Teachers 
and the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools took positions based on the 
perceived advantage of being governed by the Illinois’s Educational Labor 
Relations Act (“IELRA)” versus the NLRA.  Thus, the amici, in effect, argued in 
favor of positions that would be favorable to them in Illinois but against their 
interests in any state that exempted charter schools from the state’s public sector 
collective bargaining laws or that did not have public sector labor laws. For 
example, the losing amici unions argued that charter schools in Illinois should be 
exempt from the NLRA ignoring the adverse impact such position would have on 
unionization in states that either do not make charter schools subject to public 
sector bargaining laws or do not have public sector labor laws.[6] In essence, 
unlike Andrew Jackson who won the Battle of New Orleans without realizing that 
the War of 1812 was over, the unions lost the battle without realizing that they 
actually won the war.[7] 
II.  PUBLIC OR PRIVATE?: THE NAGGING QUESTION ABOUT 
CHARTER SCHOOLS 
A.  The Hawkins County Test 
What is a charter school? More specifically, is a charter school a “political 
subdivision” of the state under the Section 2(2) of the NLRA?[8] That was the 
question before the NLRB after Chicago Math and Science Academy, a charter 
school in Chicago, filed an election petition with the NLRB in a roundabout effort 
to defeat a representation petition filed by the Chicago Alliance of Charter Teachers 
& Staff, IFT, AFT, AFL–CIO with the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board 
(“IELRB”).[9] If charter schools are political subdivisions, then they are excluded 
from the NLRA because they do not meet the definition of “employer.”[10] The 
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NLRAexcludes from its coverage “the United States or any wholly owned 
Government Corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political 
subdivision thereof.”[11] However, if charter schools are not political subdivisions, 
then they are private employers subject to the NLRA. 
In Chicago Math and Science Academy, the NLRB applied the test for determining 
whether an entity is a political subdivision set out by the Supreme Court in NLRB 
v. Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins County.[12] Under 
the HawkinsCounty test, an entity meets the definition of “political subdivision” if 
it is either (1) created directly by the state so as to constitute a department or 
administrative arm of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are 
responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.[13] 
Hawkins County involved a natural gas utility district organized under 
Tennessee’s Utility District Law of 1937.[14] The pipefitters employed by the utility 
district petitioned the NLRB for an order directing the utility district to hold a 
representation election.[15] The utility district argued that it was a political 
subdivision under the NLRA and, accordingly, was not an employer. Applying the 
above test, the NLRB found that the utility district was not a political subdivision 
and ordered that a representation election be held among the pipefitters employed 
by the utility district.[16] 
The pipefitters union won the election and was certified as the pipefitters’ 
representative by the NLRB. However, the utility district refused to bargain with 
the union, which resulted in the pipefitters’ union filing an unfair labor practice 
charge with the NLRB.[17] The NLRB issued a cease and desist order, but the 
utility district continued to refuse to bargain with the union.[18] The union then 
sought an order from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, but the Sixth Circuit found 
that the utility district was a political subdivision and refused to order the utility 
district to bargain with the union.[19] The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision. 
The Court was confronted with two primary issues in Hawkins County. The first 
issue was whether the Tennessee Supreme Court’s finding that utility districts 
organized under the Utility District Law of 1937 “was an operation for a state 
governmental or public purpose” should be given preclusive effect on the issue of 
whether the utility district was a political subdivision.[20] The Sixth Circuit held 
that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s finding was conclusive and binding on the 
NLRB.[21] However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit. The 
Supreme Court held that such state declarations may be given “careful 
consideration,” but were not controlling.[22] This aspect of the Court’s opinion is 
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important given that state labor laws may expressly state that charter schools fall 
within their coverage, which is precisely the case in Illinois.[23] 
Second, in light of the Court’s holding that state declarations are not to be given 
preclusive effect, the Court had to determine whether the natural gas utility district 
was a political subdivision under the NLRA. On this issue, the Court applied the 
NLRB’s two-pronged test, under which, an entity is a political subdivision if it is 
either (1) created directly by the state so as to constitute a department or 
administrative arm of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are 
responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.[24] 
The Court focused on the second prong of the test, and found that the utility district 
was a political subdivision. The utility district was administered by a Board of 
Commissioners appointed by an elected county judge and subject to removal 
through proceedings that could be initiated by the governor, the county prosecutor, 
or private citizens. The Court stated, “[p]lainly, commissioners who are beholden 
to an elected public official for their appointment, and are subject to removal 
procedures applicable to all public officials, qualify as ‘individuals who are 
responsible to public officials or to the general electorate’ within the Board’s 
test.”[25] 
Additionally, the Court described numerous other factors that indicated the utility 
district was a political subdivision. The Court noted that the utility district was 
granted the power of eminent domain, its records were public records subject to 
inspection, the commission was granted subpoena power, the district’s bonds were 
given tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code, and social security 
benefits were provided to the district’s employees through voluntary coverage 
rather than mandatory coverage because the district was considered a political 
subdivision under the Social Security Act.[26] 
B.   The Chicago Math and Science Academy Decision 
In Chicago Math and Science Academy, the NLRB addressed the question of 
whether charter schools are “political subdivisions” under the NLRA for the first 
time, although NLRB administrative law judges had ruled on the 
question.[27] In In Re C.I. Wilson Academy, Inc., an NLRB administrative law 
judge in Arizona ruled that charter schools established under Arizona’s charter 
school law are not political subdivisions under the NLRA.[28] Further, the NLRB 
itself had ruled that private companies that contract with charter schools to 
manage the charter school and employ the staff at the schools are also not political 
subdivisions.[29] However, the NLRB had not squarely addressed the question of 
whether charter schools fall under the “political subdivision” exemption of the 
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NLRA. At the time that the NLRB accepted review of this case, the question of 
whether charter schools should be considered political subdivisions under the 
NLRA was such an open issue that the NLRB invited the public in January 2011 to 
submit amicus briefs on the issue.[30] 
 The Illinois Charter Schools Law 
Under the Illinois Charter Schools Law, Illinois charter schools must be “organized 
and operated as a nonprofit corporation or other discrete, legal, nonprofit entity 
authorized under the laws of the State of Illinois.”[31] Illinois charter schools must 
also be “public, nonsectarian, nonreligious, non-home based, and non-profit 
school[s].”[32] Illinois charter schools are subject to the Illinois Freedom of 
Information Act and the Illinois Open Meetings Act.[33] Additionally, Illinois 
charter schools receive the vast majority of their funding from public sources, with 
the majority of those funds coming from property tax dollars designated for the 
local school district in which the charter school operates.[34] Currently, the 
Charter Schools Law limits the number of charter schools that may operate in the 
state to 120, 75 of which may operate in the City of Chicago.[35] 
The Illinois Charter Schools Law exempts charter schools from many of the state 
laws and regulations that govern the operation of traditional public 
schools.[36] Under this broad exemption, an Illinois appellate court held that 
charter schools were not subject to the IELRA.[37] However, just prior to the 
Appellate Court’s decision, the General Assembly amended the Charter Schools 
Law to expressly make charter schools subject to theIELRA.[38] The General 
Assembly also amended the IELRA to expressly include “the governing body of a 
charter school” within the definition of “employer” under the statute.[39] 
An application to establish a charter school must be submitted to the local school 
board within the school district where the charter school will operate and “may be 
initiated by individuals or organizations that will have majority representation on 
the board of directors or other governing body of the corporation or other discrete 
legal entity that is to be established to operate the proposed charter 
school....”[40] The charter school proposal must be submitted in the form of a 
proposed contract between the charter school and the local school 
board.[41] Within forty-five days of its receipt of the charter proposal, the local 
school board must hold a public meeting to gather information to assist it in its 
evaluation of the charter proposal.[42] The local school board must vote on 
whether to approve or deny the proposal within thirty days of the public 
meeting.[43] 
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If the local school board votes to approve the charter proposal, the proposal must 
be certified as complying with the Charter Schools Law by the Illinois State Board 
of Education.[44] The certified charter constitutes a binding contract between the 
charter school and the local school board “under the terms of which the local school 
board authorizes the governing body of the charter school to operate the charter 
school on the terms specified in the contract.”[45] Charter school applicants whose 
proposals are denied may appeal the local school board’s decision to the Illinois 
State Charter Commission, which may reverse the local school board decision if it 
finds that the proposal complies with the Charter Schools Law and is in the best 
interests of the local school district’s students.[46] 
A charter may be revoked by the local school board if the local school board clearly 
demonstrates that the charter school did any of the following: (1) committed a 
material violation of any of the conditions, standards, or procedures set forth in 
the charter; (2) failed to meet or make reasonable progress toward achievement of 
the content standards or pupil performance standards identified in the charter; (3) 
failed to meet generally accepted standards of fiscal management; or (4) violated 
any provision of law from which the charter school was not exempted.[47] In such 
cases, the charter school is given up to two years to remedy the problem.[48] Only 
after the local school board finds that the charter school failed to remedy the 
problem or follow the proposed timeline for remediation may the local school 
board revoke the charter.[49] 
  NLRB Holds that Illinois Charter Schools are Not “Political 
Subdivisions” 
In June of 2010, teachers at Chicago Math and Science Academy filed a recognition 
petition with the IELRB after two-thirds of the teaching staff signed authorization 
cards designating the Chicago Alliance of Charter Teachers as their exclusive 
bargaining representative.[50] Under the IELRA, the governing board of charter 
schools are included within the definition of “employer” and covered by the 
law.[51] The push to unionization at Chicago Math and Science Academy was part 
of a larger campaign being waged at charter schools across the city as the Chicago 
Teachers Union sought to unionize all of the city’s charter schools.[52] 
Chicago Math and Science Academy, however, refused to recognize the union, 
arguing that it was a private employer, and thus governed by the NLRA, not the 
IELRA.[53] In response to the union’s representation petition filed with the 
IELRB, Chicago Math and Science Academy filed a petition with the NLRB on July 
29, 2010, contending that it was a private employer covered by the NLRA.[54] The 
union, meanwhile, argued that Chicago Math and Science Academy was exempt 
from the NLRA as a “political subdivision” of the State of Illinois.[55] The Acting 
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Regional Director of Region 13 held that Chicago Math and Science Academy is a 
political subdivision of the State of Illinois under both prongs of the Hawkins 
County test.[56] 
On December 14, 2012, the NLRB handed down its decision  holding that Chicago 
Math and Science Academy Charter School, Inc. was not a political subdivision of 
the State of Illinois. As such, Chicago Math and Science Academy was subject to 
the NLRA as a private employer. 
Under the first prong of the Hawkins County test, the NLRB determines first 
whether the entity “was created directly by the state, such as by a government 
entity, a legislative act, or a public official.”[57] If so, the NLRB then asks “whether 
the entity was created so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of 
the government.”[58] In this case, Chicago Math and Science Academy was 
incorporated under the Illinois Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986 by five 
private individuals in 2003. As such, the NLRB found that the first prong of 
the Hawkins County test did not apply because Chicago Math and Science 
Academy was created by private individuals, not by a government entity, a 
legislative act, or a public official.[59] To that end, the NLRB stated: 
There is no Illinois statute that directs that charter schools be created or that directly 
creates charter schools. Indeed, absent the independent initiative of private individuals 
and the separate authority of the Not-for-Profit Corporation Act, the Charter Schools Law 
would do nothing to bring charter schools into existence. Rather, the Charter Schools Law 
provides that if a charter school is to be created, it must be created by private individuals 
who first must establish a private corporation that in turn creates the charter school. And 
that is what happened here: private individuals established CMSA first as a nonprofit 
corporation, and only then did CMSA establish the Academy. The State of Illinois, by 
enacting its Charter Schools Law, has in essence authorized individuals, acting through 
private corporations, to establish and operate charter schools, with the Charter Schools 
Law acting as the “framework” or “roadmap” by which the schools are operated.[60] 
The NLRB also found that Chicago Math and Science Academy was not 
“administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the 
general electorate” under the second prong of the Hawkins County test. On this 
issue, the NLRB asks whether the individuals responsible for administering the 
entity are appointed by or subject to removal by public officials.[61] To make this 
determination, the NLRB looks to “whether the composition, selection and 
removal of the members of an employer’s governing board are determined by law, 
or solely by the employer’s governing documents.”[62] Where the majority of the 
individuals responsible for administering the entity are subject to appointment 
and removal by private individuals, as opposed to public officials, then the NLRB 
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will find that the entity is not a political subdivision under the second prong of 
the Hawkins County test. 
In this case, the NLRB found it dispositive that none of the individuals on the 
governing board of Chicago Math and Science Academy were appointed by or 
subject to removal by any public official. The process for removing and selecting 
board members was set forth in Chicago Math and Science Academy’s bylaws, not 
by statute or regulation. The bylaws provided that only sitting board members 
could appoint or remove other board members. As the NLRB stated, “no person 
affiliated with Chicago Public Schools, the Chicago or State Boards of Education, 
the Illinois Department of Education, or any other local or state official has any 
involvement in the selection or removal of any members of CMSA’s governing 
board.”[63] 
The NLRB declined to even consider  “additional factors” that it had discussed in 
prior cases, such as whether the entity is subject to the state’s Freedom of 
Information Act and Open Meetings Act. The NLRB stated that these factors are 
relevant only after the NLRB makes its political subdivision determination. The 
NLRB stated that the additional factors are relevant only to support or reinforce 
the NLRB’s determination,[64] which basically renders the additional factors 
meaningless in the analysis. 
Still, under Section 14(c)(1) of the NLRA, the NLRB has the discretion to “decline 
to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of 
employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on 
commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its 
jurisdiction.”[65] Thus, the final issue before the NLRB was whether it should, 
nevertheless, decline jurisdiction over Chicago Math and Science Academy. The 
National Education Association, in  an amicus brief,argued that the NLRB should 
so decline to assert jurisdiction over Chicago Math and Science Academy under 
Section 14(c)(1). The National Education Association argued that the state’s 
obligation to provide public schools was a local concern and that its regulation of 
charter schools created a “special relationship” between the charter schools and 
the state.[66] However, the NLRB rejected this argument, finding that the state 
does not assert sufficient control over the charter school’s finances so as to create 
a “unique relationship” between the charter schools and the state under NLRB 
precedent.[67] 
In so holding, the NLRB distinguished a 1972 decision in which it declined to assert 
jurisdiction over Temple University due to the “unique relationship” between 
Temple and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.[68] In that case, the NLRB 
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found that Temple University had been designated as an “instrumentality” of 
Pennsylvania and that Pennsylvania exercised substantial control over the 
university’s finances.[69] Further, 12 of the 36 board members were appointed by 
the governor, the president pro tempore of the senate, and the speaker of the house 
of representatives who were each authorized to appoint four of the trustees to 
staggered 4-year terms.[70] In declining to assert jurisdiction over Temple 
University, the NLRB stated, “[a]lthough the University is in form a private, 
nonprofit institution . . . [u]nder the special circumstances of this case, we find that 
it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over the 
University.”[71] 
The NLRB distinguished Temple University on the basis that Illinois exercises far 
less control over Chicago Math and Science Academy’s finances than Pennsylvania 
exercised over Temple University’s finances.[72] Further, the NLRB noted that 
neither the State of Illinois nor any other governmental entity appoints any 
members to the Chicago Math and Science Academy board of directors.[73] 
The NLRB’s holding in Chicago Math and Science Academy answers the question 
of whether a charter school should be considered a political subdivision or a private 
employer under the NLRA (at least with respect to charter schools established 
under Illinois law). Under the Hawkins County test, as applied in this case, a 
charter school will not be considered a political subdivision if it is organized as a 
private corporation and governed by individuals, a majority of whom, are not 
appointed and may not be removed by a public official. As such, unless a state’s 
charter school law directly establishes the charter school, or provides a mechanism 
for public officials to appoint or remove charter school board members, the charter 
school will likely be found to be a private employer subject to the NLRA. 
The NLRB’s decision exhibits a cramped view of the structure and organization of 
charter schools and ignores the very purpose for creating charter schools in the 
first place. Charter schools are formed and operate much like Tennessee utility 
districts in Hawkins County. Although the Chicago Math and Science Academy 
was organized under the Illinois Not For Profit Corporation Act, a charter school 
does not need to be a not-for-profit corporation,[74] and being a not-for-profit 
corporation does not make it a charter school. Rather, similar to the utility District 
in Hawkins County, a charter school must seek a charter from an arm of the 
state.[75] Once established, charter schools are funded like public school 
districts, [76] and unlike private schools, they cannot exist without such public 
funding. [77] 
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Additionally, the very nature of charter schools should qualify them as a political 
subdivision of the state. As stated by the Illinois General Assembly: 
In authorizing charter schools, it is the intent of the General Assembly to create a 
legitimate avenue for parents, teachers, and community members to take responsible 
risks and create new, innovative, and more flexible ways of educating children within the 
public school system. The General Assembly seeks to create opportunities within the 
public school system of Illinois for development of innovative and accountable teaching 
techniques. The provisions of this Article should be interpreted liberally to support the 
findings and goals of this Section and to advance a renewed commitment by the State of 
Illinois to the mission, goals, and diversity of public education.[78] 
Charter schools are intended to be public schools, open to all,[79] to carry out a 
public mission of providing a better education not only for the students they serve 
but also for the students of the state’s other public schools that will be able to adopt 
the proven educational innovations of the charter schools. The Illinois 
Constitution’s mandate that the state “provide for an efficient system of high 
quality public educational institutions and services.” [80] empowers the 
Legislature to fulfill the mandate by creating entities  that are not necessarily 
limited to school districts.[81] As such, charter schools are not mere government 
contractors. 
More importantly, the NLRB’s decision ignores the reasons behind the NLRA’s 
exemption for states and their political subdivisions. As the Court stated 
in Hawkins County: 
The legislative history does reveal, however, that Congress enacted the § 2(2) exemption 
to except from Board cognizance the labor relations of federal, state, and municipal 
governments, since governmental employees did not usually enjoy the right to strike. In 
the light of that purpose, the Board, according to its Brief, p. 11, ‘has limited the exemption 
for political subdivisions to entities that are either (1) created directly by the state, so as 
to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered 
by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.’[82] 
The decision to afford charter school employees the protection of the state 
collective bargaining laws and grant them the right to strike turns on the purpose 
of charter schools to be laboratories of educational innovation, free from the 
constraints that bind traditional public schools. This core mission can be frustrated 
just as surely by restrictions contained in a collective bargaining agreement or the 
collective bargaining process itself, as it can by excessive governmental 
regulation.[83] 
Education is and has been a primary concern of the states. Accordingly, the NLRB 
must give at least some deference to the state’s intent in creating charter schools. 
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Although the NLRB acknowledged Illinois’ characterization of charter schools as 
being within the public school system as “worthy of careful consideration,”[84] it 
is clear that the NLRB gave it no consideration at all. At the very least, in light of 
the strict oversight of charter schools provided for in the chartering process, the 
NLRB should have exercised its discretion and declined to assert jurisdiction under 
section 14(c)(1) of the NLRA.[85] 
The NLRB’s attempt to distinguish Temple University amounts to “not seeing the 
forest for the trees” because it focuses too much on the amount of control that the 
state asserts over the charter school’s finances and whether the state can appoint 
members to the school’s board of directors, while ignoring other important 
considerations. For example, the NLRB ignored the fact that almost all of the 
financing for Illinois charter schools comes from local funding generated by 
property tax dollars.[86] The NLRB also gave short shrift to the fact that 
educational issues are traditionally within the sovereign powers of the 
states.[87] In essence, the NLRB applied a variant of the Hawkins County analysis 
to the question of whether it should decline to assert jurisdiction over Chicago 
Math and Science Academy under Section 14(c)(1), making the amount of control 
the state exerts of the charter school the focus of the analysis. As such, it would 
appear that entities that do not qualify as political subdivisions under Hawkins 
County also would not enjoy a “unique relationship” with the state under Temple 
University. Factors such as the tradition of state control over public education, 
whether the charter school is subject to the state’s FOIA and OMA laws, and the 
source of the charter school’s funding become irrelevant. 
Ultimately, the impact of Chicago Math and Science Academy will depend on 
several factors, including, the statutory process other states follow to establish 
charter schools, whether the state has a public labor relations law, and if so, how 
the state’s public labor relations law compares with the NLRA. 
III. CHICAGO MATH AND SCIENCE ACADEMY’S IMPACT 
The key question is how the Chicago Math and Science Academy decision will 
impact labor relations moving forward.[88] Will the decision make it more 
difficult for charter school employees to unionize? Will the decision open up 
opportunities to employees who previously had no mechanism for unionization? 
Or will the decision have little or no impact? Depending on the state we are 
examining, the answer to each of these questions could be “Yes.” 
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A.  Other States 
The NLRB’s decision in Chicago Math and Science Academy will have the greatest 
impact, not on Illinois charter schools, but rather on the charter schools in states 
that either do not have a public sector labor law or exempt charter schools from 
such laws. Despite those states’ clear intent to not grant collective bargaining rights 
to charter school employees, their employees now gain these rights under the 
NLRA through the NLRB’s decision. Based upon the NLRB’s reasoning and the 
great lengths it took to find that charter schools are not political subdivisions, it is 
doubtful that the results will be different in other states. As such, in these states, 
charter school employees who previously did not have the ability to organize will 
now be able to form unions and bargain collectively under the NLRA. 
Of course, there is an easy way out for states that do not want their charter schools 
covered by the NLRA. Under Hawkins County, charter schools would be 
considered political subdivisions if they are either created directly by the state, or 
“administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the 
general electorate.”[89] Thus, in Illinois, the Charter Schools Law could be 
amended to allow the local school district or state entity which granted the charter 
not only the power to revoke the charter, but also the power to remove those who 
administer the charter school if the charter school fails to meet the Law’s 
requirements. The Charter Schools Law could also be amended to allow citizens 
the right to remove charter school board members by referendum. Amending the 
Charter Schools Law to allow the state or citizens to remove board members, 
however, may be contrary to the general purpose of charter schools, which is to 
provide a greater degree of flexibility to experiment with educational 
programming. If charter school board members could be removed by the state or 
the electorate, fewer individuals may be willing to start a charter school in the first 
place or experiment with less traditional educational programming. 
B. Illinois 
It would appear that one of the primary reasons Chicago Math and Science 
Academy sought to be designated as a private employer by the NLRA was to avoid 
the “card check” process under Illinois law. Under the IELRA, “an educational 
employer shall voluntarily recognize a labor organization for collective bargaining 
purposes if that organization appears to represent a majority of employees in the 
unit.”[90] If there is a dispute as to whether the union represents a majority of the 
proposed bargaining unit, the dispute is resolved by the IELRB.[91] Elections are 
held only if two or more employee organizations seek to represent the same group 
of employees.[92] The “card check” process simply requires an employee to sign 
an authorization card indicating that he or she authorizes the union to be his or 
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her representative. Once a majority of employees have signed the authorization 
card, under the IELRA, the employer must recognize the union. 
Under the NLRA, however, union representation is generally decided through an 
election by secret ballot ordered by the NLRB.[93] Usually, the employer and 
union engage in campaigning for weeks prior to the election. During the campaign 
process, the employer may distribute information opposing the union and require 
employees to attend meetings on the question of union representation where the 
employer presents a one-sided argument against the union, also known as “captive 
audience speeches.[94] Employers also often hire outside consultants to manage 
the campaign and encourage fellow employees to vote against the 
union.[95] Union organizers contend that NLRB election “procedures fails to 
protect employees’ rights to organize, and forces unions to compete against a 
stacked deck that unfairly favors employers.”[96] Indeed, studies have shown that 
the level of union support at the beginning of the campaign drops off significantly 
by the election.[97] One such study found that “even where 70 percent or more of 
employees signed authorization cards asking for a Board-run representation 
election, the union won less than two-thirds of those elections.”[98] 
Given the hurdles that the NLRB election process places in front of union 
organizing efforts when compared with the efficiency of “card check,” it may be 
expected that the NLRB’s decision in Chicago Math and Science Academy will 
make it significantly more difficult for unions to organize teachers employed at 
charter schools in Illinois. However, the impact may be less significant than it 
initially appears, at least in states like Illinois that have strong teachers’ unions. As 
a practical matter, public school employees, whether teachers or custodians, have 
not had a difficult time organizing even before the card check process was adopted. 
Employer campaigns have been remarkably unsuccessful. Over ninety percent of 
Illinois public school teachers are unionized, and teachers have a long history of 
organizing in the state.[99] As a result, despite the apparent collapse of the union 
organizing campaign at Chicago Math and Science Academy after the NLRB 
decision, there is little reason to believe that the NLRB election process will have a 
detrimental impact on the unionization of charter school employees in Illinois and 
other states that have a strong teachers union and long history of organizing.[100] 
One other possible motivation for management’s desire to be covered by the NLRA 
is the belief that the scope of bargaining is narrower under the NLRA than it is 
under the IELRA, but that does not appear to be the case. Both acts define the 
scope of bargaining similarly, and the Illinois Supreme Court has followed federal 
precedent with respect to the scope of bargaining in Illinois.[101] 
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In Illinois, these mandatory subjects of bargaining include: class size; individual 
student learning plans; teacher planning time; reductions in force; and employee 
performance incentives.[102] The mandatory subjects in the educational field are 
similar, if not broader under the NLRA. They include such subjects as: faculty 
evaluation for the purpose of probation, rank and tenure,[103] and curriculum 
development, degree requirements, selection of department and admission 
requirements for job responsibilities.[104] As such, the NLRB’s decision, at least 
in Illinois, may not have much impact on the scope of bargaining for charter school 
employees. However, in states that have a limited scope of bargaining for 
educational employees, organizing under the NLRA may give charter school 
employees greater opportunity to bargain over their terms and conditions of 
employment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Who was the winner? 
The winner in this case appears to be the NLRB itself, which now can bootstrap 
this decision to assert jurisdiction over virtually all charter schools. 
Chicago Math and Science Academy is a clear winner and the Chicago Teachers 
Union is a clear loser. After the decision, the union withdrew its representation 
petition. 
Illinois charter schools and their unions appear to have fought to a draw. The 
practical impact of the differences between coverage under the IELRA and the 
NLRA on employee relations is fairly minimal. And while charter schools are 
spared dealing with unions not strong enough to win representation elections, 
unions are also spared the problem of representing employee groups too weak to 
win an election. 
For unions seeking to organize charter schools in states that do not have public 
sector collective bargaining laws, this case is a big win. They can now organize 
charter school employees under the NLRA where previously these employees had 
no opportunity to organize. Likewise, this case is a win for unions in states where 
charter schools are exempted from public sector labor laws. Additionally, this case 
may be a victory for charter school employees in states that narrowly define the 
scope of bargaining for educational employees under their public sector collective 
bargaining laws because the NLRA may provide a broader range of mandatory 
bargaining subjects. 
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The charter schools in other states are neither winners nor losers. They may now 
have to deal with unionization of their workforce and the practical problems of 
dealing with unions, but unions are not an insurmountable obstacle to providing a 
quality education. Public schools have done so and charter schools will continue 
doing so. If anything, this decision will provide an incentive to charter schools to 
adopt practices and policies that eliminate the reasons that employees seek the 
protections offered by unions. 
The biggest losers are the states that have viewed collective barraging as a threat 
to their  charter schools’ unique status as laboratories for educational change and 
innovation. The NLRB has usurped these states’ power to make this decision. 
In light of the possible results of the case, the only questions that remain are why 
did the parties take the positions they took and why was this case fought at all? For 
the Chicago Math and Science Academy and the Chicago Teachers Union the 
answer is obvious. Both parties  correctly realized that, in this case, the union did 
not have the organizational strength to win an election under the NLRA.  For 
the amici the answer to these questions may not be so simple,” Despite the 
national impact of this case, the amici may have focused only on the impact this 
decision would have on the Chicago charter schools. Or it may be simply that the 
public sector unions (the NEA and AFT)  may just feel  more comfortable before a 
state public labor relations board, and the National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools whose member charter schools, are generally governed by individuals 
from the private sector, likely feel more comfortable under the NLRA. 
In the end, it may not really matter because under the Hawkins County test, the 
states have the power to make charter schools political subdivisions, and thus 
exempt from the NLRA, either because they prefer charter schools to be under state 
labor laws or exempt for all such laws. All the states need to do is make those who 
administer charter schools responsible to the state or the electorate. As such, 
parties unhappy with the NLRB’s decision should lobby the General Assembly for 
an amendment to the Charter Schools Law. The question, in the end, will be 
whether the legislators who must change the law to ensure that the state’s charter 
schools are exempt from the NLRA will be willing to tackle the issue at all. In 
Illinois, the General Assembly has just recently shown a willingness to confront 
charter schools head on.[105] Whether the General Assembly is willing to wade 
into this labor relations battle, however, is yet to be seen. 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
By, Student Editorial Board: 
Marco Berrios, Kelly Carson, Alec Hausermann, and Stephanie Ridella 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee 
Relations Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes and the equal employment 
opportunity laws. 
I.  IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Subcontracting 
In AFSCME, Council 31 v. McLean County Unit Dist. 5, Case No. 2012-CA-0043-
S (IELRB 2013), the IELRB affirmed the rulings of the ALJ finding that McLean 
County Unit Dist. 5 (McLean) had violated sections 14(a)(1), 14(a)(3), and 14(a)(5) 
of the Illinois Education Labor Relations Act “by entering into a contract for 
transportation services with a [private company] and discharging [American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31’s 
(“AFSCME”)] members in retaliation for their union activity” and “by unilaterally 
entering into a contract to subcontract all of its transportation services.” The 
14(a)(3) charge alleged that McLean subcontracted the employees’ jobs in 
retaliation for their having selected AFSCME as their exclusive bargaining 
representative.  The IELRB stated that all elements of the prima facie case for a 
section 14(a)(3) violation had been met, based on the timing of McLean’s choice to 
subcontract in relation to AFSCME being elected the exclusive bargaining 
representative. Essentially, McLean caused the bargaining unit, that had just 
elected AFSCME, to cease to exist by subcontracting the jobs of the members of the 
bargaining unit. It was determined that this created a significant hindrance upon 
the employees’ right to organize. 
The establishment of the prima facie case normally would shift the burden to the 
employer to show a legitimate business reason for its actions, but the Board agreed 
with the ALJ in finding that in cases where the retaliatory action is inherently 
destructive of employees’ statutory rights, even a legitimate business reason may 
not remove the inference that McLean intended to discourage employees from 
exercising their statutory rights. 
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The IELRB also agreed with the ALJ’s findings of a section 14(a)(5), refusal to 
bargain, violation. The IELRB found that the ALJ correctly applied the standards 
that it is a violation to unilaterally change the status quo of a mandatory subject of 
bargaining without providing the exclusive representative with notice and the 
ability to bargain or not bargaining to an impasse with that exclusive bargaining 
representative. 
McLean’s also excepted to the ALJ’s remedy, which ordered McLean to rescind its 
agreement with the private transportation company, reinstate terminated 
bargaining unit members, make whole any bargaining unit members that were 
effected, and bargain with AFSCME in good faith. McLean argued that having to 
rescind its contract with the private transportation company would be unduly 
burdensome, but the IELRB did not agree, pointing out that rescission of the 
agreement is the standard remedy in such instances in such circumstances. 
II.  IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Duty to Bargain 
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 700 and Lake County Circuit 
Clerk, 29 PERI ¶ 179 (ILRB State Panel 2013), the State Panel reversed the 
recommendation of the administrative law judge and found that the County 
bargained in good faith over a fair share clause in the collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA).  The Union claimed that the County engaged in surface 
bargaining in violation of sections  10(a)(4) and 10(a)(1) of the IPLRA while 
negotiating an initial CBA.  The basis for the Union’s claim was the County’s refusal 
to agree to a fair share clause in the CBA.  The parties were able to tentatively agree 
to a number of items after the Union’s first proposal, but the County omitted the 
fair share clause in its proposal. 
In the course of nine months, the parties reached tentative agreement on a number 
of issues, but the County refused to make concessions on the fair share clause.  The 
Union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging, among other charges, that the 
County engaged in surface bargaining.  Negotiations continued for six months 
after the charge was filed, but the County continued to reject modified proposals 
regarding the fair share clause. 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the ALJ did not accept the County’s 
position that it had engaged in hard bargaining but in not surface bargaining 
.  Because the County refused to consider a fair share clause at all, the ALJ found 
that it did not have the required intent to reach an agreement.  The County argued 
that under Section 7 of the IPLRA it was not obliged to agree to a proposal or make 
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concessions.  The County pointed to the many other issues agreed upon over the 
course of numerous bargaining sessions, and said that it had considered the 
proposed fair share clause, but rejected it because it would impose economic 
hardship upon its employees and not be in all of the employees’ best interests. 
The State Panel, dismissing the charge, reiterated the principle that the Panel is 
not empowered to force a party to make a concession on any particular issue, 
despite the obligation to bargain in good faith with the intent to reach an 
agreement.  The Panel agreed that the ALJ had articulated the correct standard, 
looking at the totality of the circumstances, but that the ALJ’s conclusion was 
based solely on the refusal to negotiate a fair share clause, and ignored the fact that 
the parties engaged in meaningful negotiations over many issues, reaching a 
number of tentative agreements.  Besides the County’s alleged unreasonableness 
over fair share, no other evidence of bad faith could be found in the record. 
The Panel conceded that the subject of fair share is significant, and exactly the type 
of issue an employer might exploit to avoid agreement, clothed in the guise of hard 
bargaining.  For that reason, the Panel stated that an employer’s intransigence on 
such an issue should “draw particular scrutiny.”  However, in the absence of other 
evidence of bad faith, the Panel refused to find surface bargaining solely because 
the County refused to make a concession on this one issue.  While the County’s 
position on fair share might be pretextual, the Panel would not find the County’s 
refusal to consider fair share per se unreasonable absent other evidence of bad 
faith.  To find surface bargaining based solely on a refusal to negotiate this one 
issue would be “tantamount to creating a per se rule requiring employers to make 
concessions on fair share proposals,” would be contrary to legislative intent and 
Board precedent.  Because the parties were negotiating an initial agreement, the 
Panel distinguished the instant case from cases where a party’s position was 
inconsistent with the position taken in other negotiations. 
B.   Supervisors 
In Service Employees International Union, Local 73 v. ILRB, Local Panel, and 
City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 120279, the Fist District Appellate Court 
affirmed a decision by the Illinois Labor Relations Board, Local Panel, denying the 
representation-certification petition brought by the Union to represent 
supervising investigators employed by the City of Chicago’s Independent Police 
Review Authority (IPRA).  The Paenl had reversed an administrative law judge’s 
conclusion that the supervising investigators were supervisors within the meaning 
of section 3(r) of the IPLRA. 
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The ALJ found testimony by the IPRA’s chief administrator, Ilana Rosenzweig, was 
reliable and credible and concluded that the supervising investigators’ work was 
different form the work of the investigators because: (1) supervising investigators 
retain and exercise discretion in the reporting of misconduct and recommendation 
of discipline; and (2) supervising investigators have the authority to process 
grievances and reward subordinate employees for their performance.  However, 
the ALJ ordered that the Union be certified as the exclusive representatives of the 
supervising investigators because the (1) supervising investigators were not 
engaged in supervisory functions a preponderance of the time, and the (2) 
supervising investigators did not have managerial status under the Act, as they did 
not implement sufficiently broad policy determinations. 
The Local Panel disagreed with the ALJ’s recommendation and dismissed the 
Union’s petition, finding that the supervising investigators spent most of their time 
reviewing reports and giving instructions that went unchallenged in the vast 
majority of cases.  The Board, therefore, disagreed with the ALJ’s finding that the 
supervising investigators do not “direct” employees within the meaning of the Act; 
the Board found that the supervising investigators spent a preponderance of the 
time performing supervisory tasks. 
Section 3(r) of the IPLRA defines “Supervisor” as: 
[A]n employee whose principal work is substantially different than that of his or her 
subordinates and who has authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, 
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, direct, reward, or discipline employees, to 
adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend any of those actions, if the exercise 
of the that authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the 
consistent use of independent judgment.  Except with respect to police employment, the 
term “supervisor” includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their 
employment time to exercising that authority. 
The critical issue on appeal was whether the supervising investigators “directed” 
employees within the meaning of the Act, given the reasoning of the Board’s 
decision and Rosenzweig’s testimony that supervising investigators spent 95.5 
percent of their time assigning and supervising cases.  According to the court, one 
indicium of supervisory authority accompanied by independent judgment is 
sufficient to indicate supervisory status.  The court observed that an analysis of 
whether supervising investigators were supervisory under the Act required a 
consideration not only of whether they “direct” their employees, but also whether 
they exercise significant discretionary authority that affects wages, discipline and 
other working conditions. 
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The Union likened supervising investigators’ case reviews to “mere proofreading” 
or quality control on an assembly line; the Union also compared case review to the 
direction which lieutenants give to firefighters at a fire scene, which is derived from 
their superior skill and technical expertise, and does not require the use of 
independent judgment in the interest of the employer as required by the Act.  The 
court, however, relied on Rosenzweig’s testimony which demonstrated that 
supervising investigators gave their subordinate investigators feedback and 
written notes during investigations, and that they ensured that their subordinates 
obtained supplemental police reports, forensic test results and other type of 
supplemental information.  The court acknowledged that the Board did not focus 
on the nature of these activities, but concluded that the record indicated that the 
work involved more than proof reading or mere quality control.  Assigning and 
monitoring the investigators’ work was the most important and predominant tasks 
performed by supervising investigators.  According to the court, case law 
established that these tasks are considered “direction” under the Act. 
The Union argued that supervising investigators did not have the authority to 
reward subordinates because superiors, and not supervising investigators, make 
suggestions regarding employees’ evaluations.  But the court quickly side stepped 
that argument stating that the mere fact that a superior is involved in the decision 
making process does not exclude the supervising investigator from supervisory 
status under the Act.  Rosenzweig testified that she never rejected a supervising 
investigator’s evaluation, which led the court to conclude that supervising 
investigators’ evaluations were at least effective recommendations where 
performance evaluations were, in turn, used when considering promotions under 
the collection bargaining agreement. 
The Union also argued that the supervising investigators had no authority to 
discipline subordinates because they not consistently exercise discretion regarding 
discipline and the discretion to report misconduct did not rise to the level of 
supervisory authority.  However, the court found the record indicated otherwise, 
where Rosenzweig identified a variety of notices of progressive discipline imposed 
by supervising investigators.  The court also mentioned that just because one 
supervising investigator had never issued an oral or written reprimand did not 
mean that she lacked that authority to do so. 
III.  EEO DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Retaliation 
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct 2517 
(2013), the Supreme Court held that Title VII retaliation claims must be proved 
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according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the motivating-factor 
standard for other Title VII discrimination claims (what the Court called “status-
based discrimination” – discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin).  For status-based discrimination claims, the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 codified a lesser causation standard, where “[i]t suffices instead to show that 
the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer 
also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.” 
The Court looked to its decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 
167 (2009), where it decided that the ADEA requires proof that the prohibited 
criterion was the but-for cause of the prohibited conduct, to determine the 
causation standard for Title VII retaliation claims.  In Gross, the Court refused to 
apply the motivating-factor standard to age based discrimination claims, 
emphasizing that Congress failed to amend the ADEA when it amended Title VII 
in 1991, despite the two statutes’ similar wording. 
The Court reasoned that the 1991 Civil Rights Act language incorporating the 
motivating-factor standard addressed only status-based discrimination, not 
retaliation.  Additionally, the structure of the statute was instructive.  Congress 
inserted the motivating-factor provision as a subsection of the ban on status-based 
discrimination.  The Court presumed that Congress’s choices of words and 
structure indicated that it did not intend to address retaliation claims. 
The Court emphasized the importance of correctly interpreting the causation 
standard because of the need to efficiently allocate judicial resources, especially in 
light of the increasing frequency of retaliation claims.  Lessening the causation 
standard would increase frivolous claims, and “[i]t would be inconsistent with the 
structure and operation of Title VII to so raise the costs, both financial and 
reputational, on an employer whose actions were not in fact the result of any 
discriminatory or retaliatory intent.” 
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, lamented the Court’s decision, which “drives a wedge 
between the twin safeguards [of discrimination and retaliation claims] in so-called 
‘mixed motive’ cases.”  “In so reining in retaliation claims, the Court 
misapprehends what our decisions teach: Retaliation for complaining about 
discrimination is tightly bonded to the core prohibition and cannot be 
disassociated from it.”  The Court’s decision, making retaliation a discrete category 
from status-based discrimination, “runs up against precedent,” and diverges from 
what the Court has previously viewed retaliation as – “a manifestation of status-
based discrimination.” 
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Given that Congress’s stated purpose in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was to 
“restore and strengthen . . . laws that ban discrimination in employment,” the 
dissent could not fathom that Congress meant to exclude retaliation claims from 
the motivating-factor standard.  Furthermore, from its codification, the EEOC 
Guidance has interpreted the amendment to include retaliation, and the agency 
guidelines should be accorded respect. 
The dissent also criticized the Court’s decision as risking confusing juries by 
requiring separate standards for discrimination and retaliation.  Furthermore, the 
dissent considered “a strict but-for test is particularly ill suited to employment 
discrimination cases,” as assessing multiple motives requires guessing what would 
have happened if an employer’s thoughts were different. 
B.   Sexual Harassment 
In Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S.Ct. 2734 (2013), the Court decided who 
qualifies as a supervisor under the standard articulated in Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775 
(1998) governing employer liability for sexual harassment.  The Court held “that 
an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he 
or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against 
the victim,” adopting the Seventh Circuit’s definition.  The Court rejected the 
EEOC’s Guidance, and defined tangible employment action as the power “to effect 
a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to 
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits.” 
The Court acknowledged the varying colloquial and legal definitions of 
“supervisor,” and turned to the “highly-structured” Ellerth/Faragher framework 
to define the term.  The Court said that the “authority to take tangible employment 
actions is the defining characteristic of a supervisor, not simply a characteristic of 
a subset of an ill-defined class of employees who qualify as supervisors.”  The Court 
emphasized that the Seventh Circuit’s standard is workable, avoids confusing 
juries, and is more efficient, because often supervisor status would be determined 
as a matter of law before trial.  Parties would be able to focus on other issues at bar, 
and jury instructions would be simplified. 
The Court said that employees will not be left unprotected from co-worker 
harassment, because the Ellerth/Faragher framework holds employers liable 
when they negligently fail to stop harassment.  While a test assessing the varying 
degrees of authority an employee has over other employees is too unwieldy and 
inefficient when determining supervisor status to establish an employer’s vicarious 
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liability, under a negligence standard juries should be instructed that the nature 
and degree of authority wielded by the harasser is an important factor. 
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, would have adopted the EEOC Guidance, which asks: 
“Has the employer given the alleged harasser authority to take tangible 
employment actions or to control the conditions under which subordinates do 
their daily work?”  The dissent said that the decision of the Court diminishes the 
force of Ellerth/Faragher, ignores the realities of the modern workplace, and 
disserves the objective of Title VII.  The Court’s lauding of “simplicity and 
administrability” serves to weaken workplace protections against harassment. 
 
